

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Printing Services Division, OL

SUBJECT : Freeman Junkyard

REFERENCE : Memo to C/HSB from SSS, dtd 3 Oct 74,  
subj: Bladensburg Metal Run, Destruction  
of Classified Metal - Possibly a Safety  
Hazard

1. The Deputy Chief, Safety Branch, visited the Freeman Junk Co., Bladensburg, Maryland, on 6 November 1974 with [redacted], Physical Security Division and two members of the Printing Services Division. The visit to the junkyard was initiated by a complaint noted in the reference, which is attached.

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2. The Printing Services Division has, for years, had a classified waste disposal problem connected with a special type of metal "mat". These mats are made of a high grade aluminum with print consisting of an extremely dark insoluble type of ink. The most successful method for disposing of these mats is by melting. In the past, this melting process was conducted at the Navy Yard; however, due to a minor accident and deactivation of this activity, a new destruction site was sought. During a survey, a foundry near Baltimore, Maryland, agreed to melt the mats at a fee of \$75 per hour. The Freeman Junk Co., on the other hand, agreed to melt the plates on a contract basis and would pay Printing Services by the pound for the reclaimed aluminum. The result of the survey was to use the Freeman Junk Co.

3. Approximately once every four and one-half weeks a trip is made to the Freeman Junk Co to destroy accumulated mats. The mats are delivered by a truck driven by two Printing Services Division employees and

*This memo was never signed by [redacted]  
therefore, PSD did not receive officially.*

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escorted by one security officer in a trail car. These precautions are taken to protect the "Top Secret" material. The mats are taken to a small foundry area in the junkyard and placed in a pre-heated gas-fired crucible. After the Top Secret material is destroyed the security escort returns to Headquarters and the two staff employees observe the destruction of the Secret material.

4. The junkyard foundry violates many sections of the electrical code in the NFPA, not to mention other safety violations incurred in the foundry area. This area contains three large gas-fired ovens and three gas-fired crucibles. None of these ovens or crucibles contain temperature or pressure gauges much less have any emergency gas shut-off valves. The floor area is completely cluttered with 55-gallon barrels of metal scraps and junk waiting to be melted down. Agency personnel, in order to observe the destruction of the mats, must be within 6 feet of the crucible during the melting period.

5. The fire hazards involved in boiling and heating in the Melting and Rendering kettles in a foundry depend upon the method used in heating and the properties of the metal being liquified. The danger increases when unknown alloys are being melted. Ignition points of some metals may be reached before others. In addition, the metal may boil over and result in or produce explosive vapors. These factors are normally controlled by gas shut-off valves, boilover traps and regulated ventilation, none of which exist at the Freeman Junk Co. There have been several explosions in the past according to local employees. The only warning factor of an impending boilover and possible explosion is the crucible tender who exits in a rush.

6. The Agency is subjecting three of its employees to hazards over which it has little or no control. It is therefore imperative that this situation be corrected. This matter was discussed at a meeting with

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[redacted] Production Manager, Printing Services Division,  
and Messrs. [redacted]  
Printing Services Division, on 6 November 1974.

7. On 10 December 1974, [redacted]  
Chief, Domestic Security Branch, and [redacted]  
[redacted] of the Safety Branch visited Tompke Aluminum,  
Baltimore, Maryland to determine their capabilities for  
destruction of the PSD mats (report attached). Tompke  
is an aluminum foundry which has several large melting  
vats that are continually fired. Considering the facts  
annotated in the attached report, the Tompke ~~Co.~~ reduced  
greatly the risk to the employee as well as providing  
better security to the operation, it is recommended  
that the operation be discontinued at the Freeman  
Junk Co.

8. In the not too distant future, it is planned  
to utilize the Hammermill at [redacted] for destruction  
until such a device is installed within the Headquarters  
compound.

[redacted]  
Chief, Physical Security Division, OS

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